Does gerrymandering benefit candidates from the gerrymandering party?

Submitted by: HBaldini 86

We don't have sufficient data on the studies below to give you a short answer.


Chart summary of 13 studies examining this question
Showing up to 10 at a time

All answers are assigned by State of K users.

All labels of Literature Reviews and Highly Regarded Source are assigned by State of K. The label Highly Regarded Source, as applied to journals, is a label assigned to the top 20 journals (as measured by the h-index) in various subcategories as classified and reported by Google Scholar. As applied to NGOs, the label is assigned to US NGOs ranked by the TTCSP Global Go To Think Tank Index Reports. The information contained in a source that is labelled "highly regarded" is not necessarily more accurate than information contained in a source without that label.
Additional Recommended Studies Not in this List (yet)

Related Questions to Consider

Add question to consider
What additional question do you want someone who searches for "does gerrymandering benefit candidates from the gerrymandering party" to consider?



Summaries of studies 13
Sorted by publication year
Find and Add More Studies
Add a Specific Study to List Save this List
The study was submitted. If approved, it will be added to this list.
NO DATA
Gerrymandering Incumbency: Does Non-Partisan Redistricting Increase Electoral Competition?
"Many political advocacy groups, journalists, and scholars view decennial redis-tricting as a major force in weakening the representational link between voters and officeholders by helping insulate legislative incumbents from electoral defeat. Moti-vated by this concern, reformers in a number of states have proposed giving control over redistricting to 'politically-neutral' independent commissions. Freed from par-tisan and electoral pressures, independent redistrictors would be expected to draw districts without giving favor to parties or their incumbents. In this study, we analyze two novel datasets of alternative redistricting plans, to evaluate whether maps drawn by independent commissions are more electorally competitive than those produced by party-controlled legislatures, compared to the proposals that could have been adopted. We find that the redistricting process on the margin, helps sustain the electoral security of incumbents. Yet, counter to reformers' ex-pectations, we find that independent redistrictors produce virtually the same degree of insulation as plans devised in legislatures or by politician commissions. Overall, our results suggest caution in overhauling state redistricting institutions to increase electoral competition: independent commissions may not be as politically-neutral as theorized."
AUTHORS
John A. Henderson
Brian T Hamel
Aaron Goldzimer
PUBLISHED
2017 in SSRN Electronic Journal
NO DATA
Evaluating partisan gains from Congressional gerrymandering: Using computer simulations to estimate the effect of gerrymandering in the U.S. House
"What is the effect of gerrymandering on the partisan outcomes of United States Congressional elections? A major challenge to answering this question is in determining the outcomes that would have resulted in the absence of gerrymandering. Since we only observe Congressional elections where the districts have potentially been gerrymandered, we lack a non-gerrymandered counterfactual that would allow us to isolate its true effect. To overcome this challenge, we conduct computer simulations of the districting process to redraw the boundaries of Congressional districts without partisan intent. By estimating the outcomes of these non-gerrymandered districts, we are able to establish the non-gerrymandered counterfactual against which the actual outcomes can be compared. The analysis reveals that while Republican and Democratic gerrymandering affects the partisan outcomes of Congressional elections in some states, the net effect across the states is modest, creating no more than one new Republican seat in Congress. Therefore, the partisan composition of Congress can mostly be explained by non-partisan districting, suggesting that much of the electoral bias in Congressional elections is caused by factors other than partisan intent in the districting process."
AUTHORS
Jowei Chen
David Cottrell
PUBLISHED
2016 in Electoral Studies
NO DATA
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy
"Engstrom evaluates redistricting plans and their electoral results from all states from 1789 through the 1960s, revealing that districting practices systematically affected the competitiveness of congressional elections; shaped the partisan composition of congressional delegations; and, on occasion, determined control of the House of Representatives. Erik J. Engstrom offers a historical perspective on the effects of gerrymandering on elections and party control of the U.S. national legislature. Aside from the requirements that districts be continuous and, after 1842, that each select only one representative, there were few restrictions on congressional districting. Unrestrained, state legislators drew and redrew districts to suit their own partisan agendas. With the rise of the “one-person, one-vote” doctrine and the implementation of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, however, redistricting became subject to court oversight. Engstrom evaluates the abundant cross-sectional and temporal variation in redistricting plans and their electoral results from all the states, from 1789 through the 1960s, to identify the causes and consequences of partisan redistricting. His analysis reveals that districting practices across states and over time systematically affected the competitiveness of congressional elections; shaped the partisan composition of congressional delegations; and, on occasion, determined party control of the House of Representatives."
AUTHOR
Erik J. Engstrom
PUBLISHED
2013 by University of Michigan Press (Book)
NO DATA
Strategic Constituency Manipulation in State Legislative Redistricting
"Scholars often identify gerrymanders by examining changes to districts' partisan composition. However, advantages can also be gained by systematically varying the extent to which incumbents' constituencies remain the same. In this article, I examine the post-2000 redistricting in 22 state legislatures. I find that parties, particularly in legislatures with low turnover levels, gain advantages from constituency manipulation, but that these advantages are counteracted by geographic redistricting regulations. Lastly, I find that ostensibly bipartisan outcomes nonetheless feature partisan constituency manipulation. These findings echo a growing literature that analyzes the geographic aspects of gerrymandering and highlight how turnover patterns motivate redistricting strategies."
AUTHOR
TODD MAKSE
PUBLISHED
2012 in Legislative Studies Quarterly
NO DATA
The Limits of Partisan Gerrymandering: Looking Ahead to the 2010 Congressional Redistricting Cycle
"This article looks ahead to the 2010 congressional redistricting cycle, and makes the case that the concern over the pernicious effects of partisan redistricting has been significantly over-exaggerated. Those attempting to use partisan control of the apparatus of state government to influence future elections operate under a number of significant constraints, from legal and political factors that inhibit the redistricting process and frequently result in compromise or litigation, to geographical and structural factors that dictate the extent to which electoral boundaries can be effectively manipulated to produce deviations from partisan symmetry. Evidence from the 1990 and 2000 redistricting cycles indicates that the benefits of partisan gerrymandering, where present, are extremely susceptible to subsequent electoral swings. This casts considerable doubt on the utility of partisan gerrymandering as a mechanism for instituting long-term electoral bias in congressional elections."
AUTHOR
Nicholas R Seabrook
PUBLISHED
2010 in The Forum
NO DATA
The Rising Incumbent Reelection Rate: What's Gerrymandering Got to Do With It?
"The probability that an incumbent in the U.S. House of Representatives is reelected has risen dramatically over the last half-century; it now stands at nearly 95%. A number of authors and commentators claim that this rise is due to an increase in bipartisan gerrymandering in favor of incumbents. Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find evidence of the opposite Effect. All else equal, changes in redistricting have reduced the probability of incumbent reelection over time. The timing of this effect is consistent with the hypothesis that legal constraints on gerrymandering, such as the Voting Rights Act, have become tighter over time. Incumbent gerrymandering may well be a contributor to incumbent reelection rates, but it is less so than in the past."
AUTHORS
John N. Friedman
Richard T. Holden
PUBLISHED
2009 in The Journal of Politics
NO DATA
Gerrymandering on Georgia's Mind: The Effects of Redistricting on Vote Choice in the 2006 Midterm Election*
"Objective. We make use of individual-level survey data from the 2006 midterm election in order to determine the degree to which redistricting affected the vote choice of whites residing in Georgia Congressional Districts 8 and 12.Methods. A multivariate probit model was used to assess the probability of voting for the GOP House candidate among voters represented by the same incumbent before and after redistricting versus voters who had been newly drawn into one of these districts.Results. Despite a national tide that favored the Democratic Party in the 2006 elections, redrawn whites were more likely to vote for the Republican challengers in the districts surveyed.Conclusions. Our findings indicate that redistricting can be used to dampen the incumbency advantage. In addition, the findings of this research also speak to the continuing Republican realignment of white voters in the Deep South and to the recognition that the effects of redistricting are dependent on political context."
AUTHORS
M. V. Hood III
Seth C. McKee
PUBLISHED
2008 in Social Science Quarterly
NO DATA
Comments on Ron Johnston’s “Manipulating maps and winning elections: measuring the impact of malapportionment and gerrymandering”
"The paper presented here by Ron Johnston is not only a valuable contribution to the literature of bias in district-based elections, but also a timely call for a re-invigorated spatial analysis of electoral systems. The metric Johnston adopts for measuring this bias has the advantages of being relatively simple in both its application and the interpretation of its results, and appears promising enough to warrant its future use. In these comments, I discuss areas for possible improvement, particularly in applying the methodology to the particular circumstances of U.S. elections, and briefly examine how his findings inform more general questions of intent in partisan and racial gerrymandering. Finally, I second his call for political geographers to pay more attention to the spatial analysis of elections, a topic of considerable interest to politicians, social scientists and voters. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd."
AUTHOR
Toby Moore
PUBLISHED
2002 in Political Geography
NO DATA
Manipulating maps and winning elections: measuring the impact of malapportionment and gerrymandering
"Geography is central to the operation of almost all electoral systems, through the interaction of two maps—the punctiform distribution of voters (and their political choices) and the territorial division of national space into constituencies. This interaction invariably results in election outcomes that are both disproportional and biased—with the allocation of seats being unequal to the distribution of votes across parties (and also across time for the same party). Such disproportionality and bias can be generated through the partisan strategies of malapportionment and gerrymandering, but in addition similar results can emerge when the procedure for defining constituencies is non-partisan. This paper argues that understanding the partisan and non-partisan nature of districting and its impact on election results requires formal measurement procedures and illustrates one such procedure, using the UK over the period 1950–1997 as its main exemplar."
AUTHOR
Ron Johnston
PUBLISHED
2002 in Political Geography
NO DATA
Does Redistricting Make a Difference?
"In 1812 the Jeffersonian-dominated Massachusetts legislature, with the approval of Governor Elbridge Gerry, split Essex County in an effort to dilute the strength of the Federalists. Noting the resemblance of the new, oddly shaped district to a well-known amphibian, a local newspaper dubbed the creation a "gerrymander." Less well known about this oft-recounted episode of American history, writes political scientist Mark Rush, is its outcome: in the ensuing election, the Federalists won the district anyway. Today, politically divisive redistricting gerrymandering to some still causes bitter reapportionment disputes, renewed threats of class action lawsuits, and legislative wrangling. In Does Redistricting Make a Difference? Rush offers a skeptical inquiry into this controversy and a critical assessment of the assumptions underlying current analyses of the redistricting process. He focuses on long-term voting results in redrawn districts and concludes that redistricting at least given present criteria and guidelines has little impact. By showing how difficult it is to perpetrate a successful partisan gerrymander, Rush challenges the notion that an electorate can be organized into Democratic and Republican "groups." He further questions the validity of current political research and highly paid political consulting undertaken on the assumption that such organization is feasible. Certain to provoke discussion and debate, Does Redistricting make a Difference? is a timely look at a topic as controversial today as it was in the days of Elbridge Gerry.""
AUTHOR
Mark E. Rush
PUBLISHED
2000 by Lexington Books (Book)
NO DATA
Redistricting and Incumbent Reelection Success in Five State Legislatures
"Does redistricting affect the election success of incumbents? Does it affect the electoral fortunes of political parties? These questions are examined in five states that used different redistricting processes in 1991-1992 and in two states where the redistricting process changed from 1981-1982 to 1991-1992. In states where redistricting was highly partisan, parties controlling the process gained politically. In states where redistricting was bipartisan, that is, both parties were involved, neither party gained an advantage. Likewise, where redistricting was nonpartisan, that is, parties were excluded from the process, neither party gained an advantage and the outcome was least hospitable to incumbents."
AUTHORS
Harry Basehart
John Comer
PUBLISHED
1995 in American Politics Quarterly
NO DATA
Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting
"The purpose of this article is to assess the reality behind the politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of course, many dimensions to that perception, because redistricting has many effects. This articles focuses on the impact of boundary changes on the partisan composition of seats. In order to do this, it will be necessary to specify what the expected partisan effects of redistricting are and how they can be measured. Thus, I first explain how the impact of redistricting will vary with the strategy of particular plans and then explore some techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes. I conclude with a detailed analysis of the most important congressional redistricting in 1982—the Burton plan in California."
AUTHOR
Bruce E. Cain
PUBLISHED
1985 in American Political Science Review
NO DATA